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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper concerns the logic of age-earnings profiles and worker incentives. Alternative wage profiles yield different incentives in principal-agent models with the employer as principal and the employee as agent. This paper introduces the concept of workers' trust funds (as will be explained presently) and shows the relevance of this concept in analyzing a standard efficiency wage model.
In the most popular efficiency wage model, firms find it profitable to pay wages above market clearing to provide workers with effort incentives.' These models have been criticized because contracts in which workers pay employment fees (alternatively called up-front bonds) would eliminate involuntary unemployment [Carmichael, 1985] . The threat of forfeiting the bond generates work incentives allowing the total terms of the equilibrium labor contract to adjust to clear the labor market. Such up-front bonds are rarely observed; but it has been argued that contracts with upward sloping earnings profiles can act as perfect substitutes for contracts with explicit up-front bonds. Thus, the argument continues, the absence of up-front bonds is not a sign of the failure of market clearing.
To test the logic of the preceding argument, we assume that contracts cannot utilize up-front bonds. It will be seen that the second-best contract with an upward sloping wage profile cannot be a perfect substitute for the first-best contract with an up-front bond. Consider the work-shirk decision of a worker facing an upward sloping (but market clearing) compensation profile. This worker can be viewed as having a trust fund of deferred wages and accrued interest which is maintained by the firm. This trust fund will be forfeited if the worker is caught shirking and dismissed. In a continuous time setting, the value of this trust fund to a riskneutral worker at time T (where time 0 is the start of the contract) is (1) fT (w*(t) -w(t))er(T-t) dt, where (w*(t) -w(t)) is the difference between the worker's opportunity cost and current wage w(t) at t, and where r is the interest rate. This trust fund is the accumulated value of the worker's deferred wages including accumulated interest.
The worker in deciding whether to work or shirk compares the expected loss if caught shirking with the expected gain from shirking. Suppose that a worker who shirks for a short interval of length dt will be caught and lose his trust fund with probability p x dt, and let v dt be the monetary value to the worker of shirking for such an interval. In this case, the worker will work at time T if In other words, if the expected cost of shirking, the probability of being caught (p dt) times the value of the trust fund forfeited (the term in brackets in (2)), is at least as great as the expected gain from shirking, v dt, he will work. Rearranging terms, one can easily verify that the worker will work only if the value of his trust fund exceeds (or equals) v/p. Note that v/p is a stock, and not a flow. (To induce the worker to work for an instant of length dt, he must incur a loss if caught shirking which exceeds the ratio of the gain from shirking to the probability of being caught shirking. The gain from shirking for an instant of length dt (v dt) and the probability of being caught shirking (p dt) are both proportional to dt and small. The ratio of these two quantities, which is the size of the loss necessary to induce the worker not to shirk, is an order of magnitude larger than either since the dt's cancel in the ratio.)
The trust fund concept can be used to explain why market clearing contracts that use up-front bonds and those that use only implicit bonds through deferred payments are not perfect substitutes. The risk-neutral worker who posts an up-front performance bond of v/p or larger (and who is paid his opportunity cost throughout his job tenure) will never shirk. However, with a market clearing compensation package based on implicit bonding, no matter how low the (nonnegative) wage paid to the worker early in his job tenure, it will take some finite time before the accumulated trust fund has reached the stock level v/p. (There is a bound on how fast this trust fund can accumulate if there can be no net payments from the worker to the firm.) And, as a result, with implicit bonds and a market clearing wage package, there is some period of time before the trust fund accumulates sufficiently to induce the worker not to shirk. During that time the worker will shirk rather than work. In other words, if a firm offers an employment package that does not require an up-front bond and is no better than a worker's opportunity costs, a worker will surely shirk at the beginning of his (or her) career: there is no capital loss to the worker from losing the job, but there is a gain due to the smaller effort in shirking.
We have thus seen the flaw in the commonly held belief that market clearing upward sloping wage profiles, in the absence of explicit up-front bonding, can act as an incentive against shirking throughout a worker's career. While such deferred payments can prevent workers from shirking late in their careers, they do not prevent workers from shirking early in their careers.2 It remains, however, to show that paying a premium above market clearing wages will be a cheaper way to hire effective labor units than paying market clearing wage levels with workers shirking early in their careers. Such a proposition is not true in general. But with a rather wide variety of productivity patterns, the cost of shirking by workers early in their careers with market clearing wage schedules will be greater than the cost of paying wage premiums in excess of market clearing which prevent workers from shirking entirely. 5. We assume that firms' production functions are of the form f(e*n), where n is the number of laborers who are supplying effort e*. A worker who supplies 0 labor has no effect on output. It is said that a worker who shirks supplies 0 units of effective labor, while a worker who works supplies e* units of effective labor. 
B. Derivation of the Optimal Wage Path
The firm in this model wishes to purchase labor efficiency units at minimum unit cost. We shall show that the cost-minimizing wage package involves total payments whose sum is w*n + v/p. The alternative opportunities (which are freely available to a worker) pay a lifetime total of w*n. Thus, total remuneration from the cost-minimizing package is in excess of the total remuneration in the secondary labor market by v/p.
It is intuitive that the firm will lose nothing by paying all of the worker's remuneration at the worker's retirement date. This way the firm's expenditure on worker remuneration will do the most work in inducing workers not to shirk. At each point in his career, the worker has the inducement not to shirk of the payment at the 530 Q UARTERL Y JO URNAL OF ECONOMICS end of his career which is only received if he is never caught shirking.
Given that we need only consider compensation schemes in which all payments are made at the end of the worker's career, it is only necessary to discover the optimal total remuneration over the worker's lifetime. The worker must be paid at least w'n at the end of his career in order to be induced to join the firm. Suppose that the worker is paid won + x. What is the optimum value of the premium (x) paid to the worker above the market clearing wage stream whose lifetime value is w*n?
Given that the firm is paying the worker w n + x at the end, we can view the worker's choice problem in the following way. Suppose that a worker has not previously been caught shirking at time t. He may choose to shirk over the interval t to t + dt. This policy has the gain v dt due to the added utility from shirking. However, if the worker gets caught shirking, his total compensation will be w*(n -t) from future earnings in the secondary sector rather than the won + x available at his firm for someone never caught shirking. Consequently, if the worker plans to work from time t + dt to n, his potential gain from shirking is v dt, and his potential loss is At later times, it will be more costly for the worker to be caught shirking, and therefore the worker will work. And at earlier times it is less costly to be caught shirking and therefore the worker will shirk. As described above, equation (4) suggests the simple analogy of the trust fund which underlies much of the logic of our argument. We can pretend that the firm sets up a trust fund for its workers. It 6. If the firm could hide its knowledge of having detected a worker shirking and wait until n before dismissing a worker for a shirking offense committed at t, the worker's potential loss from shirking at t is instead p dt (w*n + x) since a worker dismissed at n will attain no outside earnings. In this case, the firm's optimal strategy is to hide its knowledge of having caught a worker shirking and wait until just prior to the worker's retirement date to fire the worker. If the worker knows that he or she has been caught shirking, this strategy has no use. At that point, the worker will seek other employment. Also, the delayed informing of the worker that he or she has been caught shirking and is in danger of disciplinary action may leave a firm open to an unjust dismissal suit in some U. S. states and would not be permissible under the dismissal rules in many European countries. 531 puts up x in the beginning when the worker is initially hired and later puts money into the trust fund at rate w*. At each point in time t, the worker must decide whether to shirk, with the ill consequence that he may be caught with probability p dt and give up the accumulated trust fund of amount w*t + x. The potential gain from shirking is v dt. Consequently, the worker is just indifferent between working and shirking at time Tx for which (7) is minimized over this range if x = vip, since the derivative of (7) with respect to x is negative for all x in the range 0 < x < v/p. As a result, the optimal (cost-minimizing) wage package will pay a premium x = v/p. This implies that Tx = 0. There is never any shirking under the optimal compensation profile and the firm makes total career payments of v/p in excess of the market.
An explanation for this solution proceeds as follows. For a worker ever to work, at the last instant worked he or she must receive a surplus of at least v/p. This v/p constitutes a fixed cost to the firm. At all previous moments worked, the worker must also have a surplus of at least vip, so that the firm pays a minimum to the worker of w*tw + v/p for working a length of time tw. By paying w*n + v/p at the end of the worker's career, the firm spreads the fixed cost v/p over the maximum working time (the worker's whole career n) and therefore unit labor cost is minimized.7 7. Hutchens [1986] shows in a shirking model in which workers are assumed to be able to post up-front bonds that the specter of firm cheating on delayed payments introduces a form of fixed costs into the employment relationship. Since a firm entails these fixed costs each time it hires a new worker, firms prefer to hire young workers with long potential tenures. Hutchens argues that firms with reputations for honesty do not face these fixed costs and should be indifferent between hiring young and old workers. In contrast, our model shows that even honest firms face the fixed costs of generating enough surplus to provide work incentives if up-front bonds are not possible.
